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Introduction : media synchronization and the Syrian
networked public sphere
1 During the Arab revolts that began in 2011, new media have been used as crucial tools
for expressing dissent and, to a certain extent, to organize collective actions.
Social  media and  digital  devices  enable  protest  movements  to  gain  attention  and
disseminate  information  without  passing  through  the  gatekeeping  and  framing
processes typical of traditional media. In addition, new media flatten the transaction
costs needed to organize collective action, even with a scarcity of material resources
and organization capabilities (Bimber, Stohl, and Flanagin, 2009). 
2 However,  the ability  of  social  movements  to  use new media effectively  depends on
many factors. The emergence of social movements always involves the production of
public representation strategies and narratives (Tilly and Wood, 2009).  At the same
time, as Bennet and Segerberg (2012) rightly noticed, with the advent of networked
communication political demands and grievances are often shared in very personalized
accounts that travel  over new media platforms,  rather than being handled through
established political organizations. In this context, communication processes have an
increasing  influence  on  how  social  movements  organize  and  structure  themselves.
With  an  increasing  amount  of  content  production,  attention  has  become  a  scarce
Micro-célébrités “non-alignées” et la sphère publique en réseau en Syrie : fr...
Communication, technologies et développement, 2 | 2015
1
resource, and political actors tend to rely on those who have more social capital in
order to promote their narratives through multiple media platforms. 
3 For  these  reasons,  in  the  context  of  the  recent  Arab  uprisings,  single  prominent
individuals emerged as playing a particularly relevant role in promoting narratives for
one side or the other. 
In fact, networked activism spontaneously produces people who acquire a particularly
relevant social capital. In their analysis of the Egyptian Twitter sphere during the 18
days  uprising  against  Hosni  Mubarak,  Johnson,  Tudor  and  Nuseibeh  (2013)  have
identified “authorities” and “hubs”, with the former having a pivotal role in organizing
protests, and the latter in disseminating information. Also, as Kraidy has described, in
Syria traditional celebrities like television actors and singers have been recruited by
both antagonists in order for them to get more visibility (2014). 
4 In their analysis on social media platforms interaction, Marwick and Boyd describe the
emergence of the phenomenon of “micro-celebrities”. They define it as “a mind-set and
set of practices in which audience is viewed as a fan base; popularity is maintained
through on-going fan management; and self-presentation is carefully constructed to be
consumed by others” (2011, p. 140). 
Tufekci,  on the other hand,  speaks of  “celebrity  networked activism” to define the
same phenomenon but  in  relation to  political  movements.  Even if  the  dynamics  of
interaction with the public are very similar to those described by Marwick and Boyd, in
celebrity  networked  activism  the  fan  base  is  replaced  by  political  activists  and
communities (2013). 
During the recent Arab uprisings, micro-celebrities of online activism played a pivotal
role  in  shaping  and  disseminating  anti-regime  narratives  through  multiple  media
platforms. In Egypt, the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” used specific discursive
strategies in order to create a sense of intimacy and proximity with their public and to
encourage it  towards  political  action (Herrera,  2014).  In  general,  some net-activists
disposing of a particularly relevant amount of social capital facilitated the production
of coherent and unifying narratives out of what otherwise would have been fragmented
pieces  of  information circulating on social  media  platforms (De Angelis, 2014).  The
importance  of  the  emergence  of  an  economy of  reputation  and  political  micro-
celebrities becomes clear if we consider that online personas with a prominent status
play a crucial role in facilitating, under some conditions, a political synchronization of
media. In fact, micro-celebrity activists were often the points of connection between
social media and traditional media at the local and the international level. 
5 With  the  term  “synchronization”  we  indicate  the  process  through  which  multiple
media  platforms  converge  in  producing  and  distributing  a  common,  coherent
narrative. Media synchronization presupposes media convergence (Jenkins, 2006), but
it takes place only when new and old media create a synergy reinforcing a single frame
on political events. Thus, according to Alexander and Aouragh, the demonstrations of
January  2011  and  those  of  30  June  2013  in  Egypt  were  accompanied  by  a  large
synchronization  of  media outlets  supporting  the  ousting  of  Mubarak  and,  later,  of
Morsi (2014). 
6 In other words,  under authoritarian regimes,  new media appear effective especially
when a certain level of homogeneity emerges in online communication flows shaping
what appears to be a single voice. What happened in the Egyptian and the Tunisian
cases can be compared to a “media event” in which the framing of a political issue is
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not contested anymore, but leans towards a single and unified narrative (Dayan and
Katz, 1992). 
However, differently from what happened in Egypt and, to a certain extent, in Tunisia,
during the Syrian uprising a synchronization of media never occurred. 
7 In this article we intend to look at the fragmented nature of the Syrian networked
public sphere that emerged after March 2011, focusing in particular on what we define
here as “non-aligned” micro-celebrities. 
8 In fact,  we argue that  the Syrian revolt  witnessed the emergence of  several  online
personas who base their web identities on individual narratives that work in opposition
to the main narratives circulating in the Syrian political scene. In this sense, “non-
aligned” micro-celebrities emerge as one of the causes, and at the same time as one of
the products, of the fragmentation of the Syrian networked public sphere and the lack
of a political synchronization of media. 
9 As  a  consequence,  the  internet  in  Syria  did  not  establish  itself  as  neither  as  an
inherently democratic medium nor as a tool in the hands of authorities or any specific
political faction, but rather as a “Fifth Estate” (Dutton, 2009) whose effects on political
processes depend on numerous strategic and non-strategic choices made by political
actors. 
10 Whereas “non-aligned” micro-celebrities are also to be considered as active agents in
the  daily  reproduction of  a  fragmented online  sphere,  the  main causes  behind the
fragmentation  strictly  depend  on  the  political  context  of  Syria.  Indeed,  since  the
beginning the Syrian uprising has been a contested political event that did not enable
the  creation  of  a  synchronization  of  media,  and  this  affected  also the  role  of
communication technologies in relation to political processes. 
11 The Syrian regime, and in particular Bashar al-Assad, probably enjoyed more support
than  other  Arab  political  leaders  when  the  protests  erupted.1From  early  on,  the
opposition  appeared  divided  and  fragmented,  both  at  the  geographical  and  the
political-ideological level.2 The weakness of the civil society and the unpreparedness,
both at the technical and the organizational level, of media opposition activists when it
came to  the  use  of  new technologies  (De  Angelis,  2011),  are  all  elements  that  also
contributed to hamper the shaping of a single, homogenous anti-regime narrative. 
In  this  context,  the  Syrian  regime  was  able  to  produce  and  distribute  counter-
revolution narratives among its constituencies. In a similar manner, Islamist groups
and ISIS  also  were  able  to  shape  their  particular  narratives  circulating  in  multiple
media platforms. 
12 Learning from the  experiences  of  the  Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings,  all  political
actors put many efforts into the war over social networks. It is not by coincidence that
on the 8th of February 2011 the regime decided to unblock platforms like Facebook and
Youtube, in what appeared at the time as a risky decision. However, this step enabled
Syrian authorities to follow directly Syrian activists who were promoting actions on the
web,  and  at  the  same  time  it  facilitated  the  promotion  of  its  narratives  by  its
supporters. The Syrian Electronic Army, a community of cyber warriors established in
May 2011 to attack regime’s enemies on the web, also testifies to how well authorities
can adapt to new technologies (Al-Rawi, 2014). 
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The case studies
13 During  the  last  four  years,  several  online  personas  acquired  a  relevant  amount  of
visibility within the Syrian networked public sphere. For our analysis, we will take as
case studies three profiles: Jihad Makdissi, Edward Dark, and Camille Otrakji. 
14 Jihad Makdissi was a long serving diplomat at the Syrian ministry of Foreign Affairs and
his  role  as  ministry  spokesperson  at  the  beginning  of  the  uprising  was  highly
publicized.  He  resigned  from  his  position  in  December  2012,  left  the  country  and
announced his divorce with the regime, but never joined any of the organized political
opposition structures. He uses mainly Facebook, where his page counts about 90.000
followers.3
15 Edward  Dark  is  the  pseudonym  and  twitter  handle  of  a  Syrian  online  activist  and
journalist from Aleppo. His online activism started with the uprising, which he saw as a
nonviolent  popular  movement.  However,  as  the  protest  movement  stalled  and  the
conflict  began  to  take  a  more  militaristic  turn,  he  gradually  disengaged  from  the
uprising’s  mainstream  narrative.  This  gradual  shift  accelerated  when  the  conflict
spread  to  his  hometown.  He  still  tweets  and  writes  from  Aleppo,  but  his  harshest
criticism is now directed at the opposition rather than the regime. He has about 15.000
followers. 
16 Camille Otrakji is a Syrian-Canadian blogger who has been active in the online Syrian
sphere since 2002. He has initiated several forums for dialogue on Syrian and regional
issues including a Syrian online think tank (2005),  Creative Forum for Bloggers (2007),
IslamComment (2010) and was heavily involved in running Joshua Landis’s SyriaComment
until late 2011. Since at least May 2011 he called on the demonstrations to stop and to
support  the  Syrian  president’s  reform  agenda  and  to  initiate  dialogue  with  the
opposition4. His Facebook page can count on more than 2000 followers and his page is
open to the general public5.
17 The choice of these three profiles is based on the fact that they present themselves and
are perceived as political activists not completely associated with any specific political
faction. Rather, they tend to promote personal views or political agendas, which, albeit
can be considered at times nearer to the revolution side and at others nearer to the
regime side, are generally shaped in contrast to the other main narratives. 
18 Jihad Makdissi supports a restructuring of the regime’s coercive apparatus upon which
its material power stands. He envisions a political transition that presupposes a heavy
redefinition  of  the  Syrian  state  through  a  process  of  reconciliation  between  the
opposition and parts of the regime. 
19 Edward Dark and Camille Otrakji, on the other hand, see the regime, at this point of the
conflict, as the only guarantor of the integrity of the State against chaos and the rise of
extremist religious groups. Otrakji’s hostility towards the uprising dates back to at least
the beginning of the protests, which he sees as too disruptive for a state like Syria. He
believes  Syria  can  sustain  a  “gradual  change”  but  not  a  “revolutionary  change”6.
Edward Dark’s sympathies for the regime come only later, around mid 2012, when, as
he says, “the uprising was hijacked” and turned into a “destruction of the state” by
“extremist forces”7. 
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20 Despite their differences, the three profiles produce narratives that do not completely
fit with any of the factions fighting on the Syrian political scene. Furthermore, they act
on an individual basis, without adhering any political organization or group. 
 
“Non-aligned” micro-celebrities: when the Other is
everywhere 
21 This is because their profiles remain strictly tethered to the individual level, without
contributing to the shaping of any collective identity. They do not belong completely to
any specific particular group or movement, even if they tend to define quite specific
political  positions  for  themselves.  Rather,  their  online  identities  reflect  the  highly
contested nature of the Syrian issue, in which no single faction (and its narratives)
manages to attain complete solidarity. 
22 Thus,  for  example,  when  a  journalist  of  the  satellite  television  al-Mayadeen asks
Makdissi about his position on the Syrian political map, he answers: “after four years of
this  Syrian  catastrophe,  no  one  wants  to  hear  us  speaking  about  who  is  with  the
opposition and who is with the government. Because this is not a job where you enter
at 8am and leave at 3pm and you say: ‘I work with the opposition’ or ‘I work with the
regime’. What we need today is a patriotic stance. And I am lucky not to be affiliated
with any political party and I have a margin of maneuver bigger than others. I am still
an independent, but sometimes people tend to mix independence with neutrality.”8 
23 Makdissi presents himself as part of the opposition, but at the same time refuses to be
associated with any particular party.  In a similar manner,  Edward Dark and Otrakji
construct their online images first of all on their anti-revolution stance, but at the same
time they refuse to be associated completely with pro-regime supporters. For example
Otrakji  says  that,  in  a  spectrum where at the extremes are the opposition and the
regime, he positions himself as “60% with the regime”9. In a Facebook post he explains
his position saying: “While I criticize both sides, I mostly criticize the ‘revolution’ side
because: 1) They have been more wrong…considerably more wrong. The government
(or President Assad) are clearly more experienced and knowledgeable about Syria and
the region. 2) They have the big media guns…while the state tries to do propaganda, it
doesn’t  have the loud speakers that  the other side has.  Whatever little  energy and
reach I have (this page is read by thousands each day) I will dedicate mostly to correct
the biased narrative of the opposition side.”10 Otrakji often refers to the parties in the
conflict  as “al-tarafain” (the two factions) taking distance from both of them. Other
times, however, he uses “tarafna” (our side) to refer to the anti-revolution side11. 
24 Edward Dark answers on Twitter to someone asking him about his rapprochement to
the  regime:  “when  the  alternative  is  the  collapse  of  ur  state,  slaughter  of
minorities+ruled by jihadi fanatics u dont really have a choice”.12
Their online activity is then based primarily on a disruptive approach and on criticizing
the Other, albeit with different nuances, rather than supporting a specific faction. 
25 Both Edward Dark and Camille Otrakji mainly publish content aimed at criticizing pro-
revolution narratives. The former focuses on denouncing rebels’ crimes and misdeeds
in Aleppo. This is, according to him, largely because he lives in West Aleppo, an area
controlled by regime forces and often attacked by opposition fighters so he has a first
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hand experience with their violations which largely go “under-reported everywhere
else”13.
26 Camille Otrakji, on the other hand, publishes content which aims at discrediting the
revolution as a whole. Many posts publish articles by western and Arab mainstream
media  he  considers  biased  in  favour  of  the  rebels,  but  always  adding  a  preface
describing their flaws and supposed biases. Sometimes he tags directly the authors of
the articles, trying to engage them in a discussion. An example is a post published on
the 4th of May 2015, in which he engages with Ibrahim Hamidi, a well-known Syrian
journalist  writing  for  the  pan-Arab  newspaper  al-Hayat,  after  including  critical
comments on his article14. He also publishes a large amount of content highlighting the
relationships between Syrian opposition and foreign powers,  and especially  the US,
Turkey, and the Gulf countries. 
27 Whereas  Edward  Dark  frames  the  revolution  as  a  failed  attempt  because  of  its
degeneration towards a destructive ethnic conflict, Camille Otrakji frames it as a proxy
war initiated by foreign countries. Moreover, his attacks towards the opposition serve
to reinforce the argument of the regime as the lesser of two evils. In particular, he
describes on the one hand the Syrian opposition in exile as corrupted and an agent in
the hands of foreign interests, and, on the other hand, he often attacks pro-democracy
activists of being insincere and not authentically democratic. 
28 The case of Jihad Makdissi is very different, since he is a politician using social media
only as  one among other  tools  of  communication in  order  to  promote his  political
agenda. He often publishes links to the interviews he gives to TV channels and to the
articles he writes, and sometimes uses posts in order to better explain his concepts and
views, and to prevent people from “distorting”15 them. In his updates he tends to stress
his distance from both the regime and the opposition, referring to their errors and
actions as an external observer. This distance is expressed even more clearly in some
posts such as one published on 4 May 2014 in which he says: “what is absent, or maybe
concealed, in the Syrian political scene is the moral and social (not political) core that
supports  national  solutions…instead  of  the  directly  supporting  the  two  political
factions, so that this core can be a factor for a moral and social pressure on the two
parts  with  the  only  aim  of  preserving  the  Syrian  state  in  all  its  components,  and
perhaps of putting back the path towards the solution into the hands of Syrians”.16
 
Visibility strategies and public engagement
29 Within  networked  communication,  each  individual  must  engage  in  “multiple  mini
performances that  combine a  variety  of  semiological  references  so  as  to  produce a
presentation of  the self  that makes sense to multiple audiences,  without sacrificing
coherence and continuity” (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 307).
30 In particular, we argue that, as sort of “free-rider” political activists, the management
of the online pages by Makdissi, Otrakji and Edward Dark can be assimilated to those of
online micro-celebrities. 
As Marwick points out, micro-celebrity is a state of being famous to a niche group of
people and, at the same time, it  is  a behavior,  in the sense of “the presentation of
oneself as a celebrity regardless of who is paying attention” (2013, p. 114). 
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31 In particular, we use here the concept of micro-celebrity to stress how Makdissi, Otrakji
and Edward Dark try to maintain an ongoing public base in order to promote their
personal views and opinions on the Syrian issue. 
The  creation  of  a  clear  online  identity,  in  other  words,  enables  them  to  attain  a
significant level of visibility even if they are outsiders in relation to other established
political groups. 
32 This implies first  of  all  a  performance of  authenticity towards their public.  Edward
Dark  presents  himself  as  an  eyewitness  and  an  impartial  reporter,  writing  for  the
online newspapers al-Monitor, and Middle East Eye. In particular, he presents himself as
an independent voice living in Aleppo and following events from very close, which is
especially noteworthy as events on the ground have been, since the early days of the
uprising, the main area of contestation between the different narratives. As he says: “I
stick to what I know best. I stick to my city, what I know about it. The people in it, the
situation in it […] so basically, I speak about the localized conflict.”17 His authenticity
reinforces  also  his  critical  stance  against  the  coverage  by  international  media.
Furthermore, this physical proximity to the event also lends credence to his reporting
on the mood and opinion of other Syrians, another major area of contestation between
the  different  narratives.  In  his  view,  war  reporting  in  traditional  media  is  “very
sterile”, and people “wanted to know the view from inside. What was going on inside,
and how we felt  towards  what  was  going  on.”18 In  fact,  many of  his  articles  focus
exclusively on gauging and reporting the public’s mood inside Syria19.
33 Jihad Makdissi presents himself as a political expert and a professional diplomat, often
invoking his professional experience in explaining and commenting on the intricacies
of  international  diplomacy  on  Syria20.  This  professional  image  and  authenticity  is
accentuated further by stressing that he “resigned” his diplomatic post and left the
Syrian regime “respectfully”, rather than “defected”21. Makdissi also uses social media
to update followers on foreign trips, invitations and meetings related to his work22. In
this way, he attempts to shape a transparent relationship with his public by reporting
in detail on his political activities and meetings. 
34 Camille Otrakji, on the other hand, builds up his online identity presenting himself as a
moderator  of  discussions  on  Syrian  issues.  In  fact,  the  idea  of  transforming  his
Facebook  page  into  a  forum “open to  anyone”  can  be  traced  back  to  his  personal
history as a creator of several online forums dedicated to Syria since 200523. When he
abandoned  the  moderation  of  the  comment  section  on  Joshua  Landis’  blog
SyriaComment because, according to him, of harsh attacks by opposition supporters, he
decided  to  move  to  social  networks.  He  stresses  that  the  polarization  made  it
impossible for him to use the forum platforms, such as Creative Forum, which he relied
on before the uprising.
35 The focus on discussion is at the core of his Internet strategies and at the same time an
aim in itself. In fact, if we examine the relationship between posts and comments on his
profile, we find that he dedicates a particular attention to interacting with the public.
Between 16 and 30 of  April  2015,  for  example,  he publishes 157 comments over 52
updates. In addition, the content itself is packaged in order to provoke discussion with
his public. As he says in the interview, he recently realized that unconsciously he was
using a very specific strategy: publishing content critical of the opposition, and then
trying to moderate especially the comments of pro-regime supporters24. In this way, he
provokes  opposition supporters  to  intervene and at the  same time tries  to  control
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excesses by pro-regime supporters during the discussion.  Also,  he dedicates several
posts to accuse pro-opposition activists of refusing dialogue with him, especially on
their pages. Thus, his Facebook page becomes a stage from which he denounces specific
opposition personalities of having him blocked on social networks or refusing to accept
criticism. For example, in a recent post on Facebook he says: “After four years, there is
one  very  important  thing  that  Syria  analysts  need  to  know  but  they  still  do  not.
President  Assad  reads  criticism  everyday.  He  seeks  it.  The  revolutionaries  and
opposition leaders (and I  closely know many) are unable to tolerate reading a long
article that challenges their understanding of Syria.”25
36 While the majority of people commenting on his page are pro-regime supporters, he
does not cease trying to attract to his page people with different perspectives. With this
purpose, not only does he engage people directly into the discussion through tagging
on Twitter and Facebook, but he also selects the content to publish in order to force
them to  take  it  into  consideration.  He  says,  for  example,  that  he  tends  not  to  use
sources that he knows are not considered credible by opposition supporters26. 
37 Building up his profile as a moderator, even if it is generally perceived as much more
on the regime side than that of the opposition, enables Otrakji to attract an audience
transforming his page in a daily forum that in his opinion is “open” and where “anyone
is  welcome”27.  Moreover,  the  topic  of  discussion  (and  especially  the  refusal  by
opposition supporters to engage with it) reinforces the critical content he publishes
against the different sides of the conflict, and especially the revolution side. The very
fact that they do not accept dialogue with him is then presented as another proof of the
flawed nature of political actors and groups. 
38 In general, the three personalities present themselves as independent figures with an
audience of both pro and anti-regime camps, and, especially in the case of Edward Dark
and Camille Otrakji,  a significant number of foreign observers and journalists.  They
also  stress  their  openness  to  interact  with  this  varied  audience.  Edward  Dark,  for
example,  says  that  he  receives  constructive  feedback  about  his  reporting  on  rebel
crimes from opposition activists on the other side of the town. This feedback, according
to him,  helps  build  a  more nuanced background to  some events,  and adds missing
details on violations by the Syrian Army as well28.
In the case of Makdissi and Otrakji, where their pages play host to these discussions,
the self-professed desire to interact with a mixed public translates itself into expanding
the  borders  of  acceptable  speech  to  include  some  of  the  “inevitable”  anger,  and
emotional language29.
39 Makdissi also points out that many of his pro-regime followers did not leave his page
when he broke ranks with the regime. He says that he intentionally chooses his media
appearances in order to reach different audiences. On this point he gave the example of
two television interviews he made after a conference in Cairo in January 2015 and that
he published on his page: One was done with al-Mayadeen news channel, with a majority
of its audience from the regime loyalist camp, while the other with Sky News Arabia,
with a majority of its audience from the opposition camp30.
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Conclusions
40 The  prominence  acquired  by  what  we  have  called  “non-aligned”  micro-celebrities
reflects the fragmentation and a-synchronization of the Syrian media field after the
2011 uprising. 
With the term “non-aligned” we described a specific set of practices and strategies at
the base of the construction of the online persona. 
41 First,  “non-aligned”  micro-celebrities  act  as  networked  individuals,  rather  than
coordinate with others in the production of collective political projects and narratives.
Second, they construct their online identities mainly in opposition to the other main
narratives competing today in the Syrian sphere. Third, they adopt strategies typical of
online  micro-celebrities  in  order  to  attract  different  publics  to  their  pages.  In
particular, they try to engage with different publics in order to promote their views on
a large political spectrum. In this operation, the rhetoric of the need of discussion and
moderation has a particularly relevant place, giving them legitimacy as autonomous
actors and, especially, in highlighting the flaws and the problems of the main political
antagonists on the Syrian scene. 
42 In so  doing,  while  in  other  contexts  of  the  so-called  “Arab  Spring”  online  micro-
celebrities  often contributed to  strengthening and disseminating unitary  narratives
necessary for collective mobilizations, in Syria “non-aligned” micro-celebrities on the
contrary tend to weaken these narratives and, as such, also the possibility of a media
synchronization. 
43 In  particular,  Edward  Dark  and Camille  Otrakji  play  an  important  role  as  counter-
narrators of the revolution, opting for a disruptive approach in which “stability”, “the
state”, and the logic of the “lesser evil” replace other forms of solidarity towards any of
the involved political factions. 
44 It is very important here to stress that, as we have seen above, Edward Dark, Jihad
Makdissi and Camille Otrakji often refer to the fact that they give voice to (and target)
the so-called “silent majority” in Syria, rather than the established political actors, i.e.
the  opposition  and the  regime in  particular.  This  enables  them to  claim that  they
represent larger constituencies, even if they act on an individual level. Thus, Edward
Dark  puts  the  accent  on  the  fact  of  giving  visibility  to  the  mood and  the  state  of
common people in Aleppo, and Jihad Makdissi often refers to “Syrians” as a separate
entity from the opposition or the regime,  putting their  interests  at  the core of  his
individual political efforts. 
45 In the same way, Camille Otrakji describes how in social networks it is only staunch
pro-regime and pro-opposition supporters who tend to be active, while the others (the
majority) tend not to interact or they do not even want to talk about politics31. In other
words, they tend to stress that the highly contested nature of the Syrian issue is an
element that undermines any claims by the existing political actors to represent the
will of the Syrian people32.
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ABSTRACTS
During the Arab uprising in 2011, new media have been used as effective tools to express dissent
and mobilize people. Flattening the transaction costs necessary to organize collective actions,
new technologies have introduced innovative forms of political struggle, based on networked
individualism and “connective action” (Bennett and Segerber, 2012) rather than on institutions
and hierarchical organizations. During the Arab uprisings, the “synchronization” (Alexander and
Aouragh, 2014) between old and new media enabled in some cases the emergence of counter-
hegemonic narratives capable to create a large consensus towards the ongoing mobilizations.
However, the limits of web 2.0 in terms of public sphere dynamics as well as a space to organize
collective actions have also emerged. 
In this article we will focus in particular on the case of the Syrian networked public sphere. We
argue that in Syria the virtual sphere appears since the beginning as a contested space on which
pro-democracy activists,  differently from other Arab contexts,  were not able to impose their
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narratives.  Rather  than  a  connected  networked  public  sphere,  a  “self-directed  mass
communication” mode (Castells, 2005) became prevalent resulting in fragmented networks.
In order to describe the dynamics of the fragmented Syrian networked public sphere, we will
focus in particular on what we define here as “non-aligned” micro-celebrities. We argue that the
Syrian  revolt  witnessed  the  emergence  of  online  personas  shaping  their  web  identities  on
individual narratives that worked in opposition to the main collective narratives circulating in
the Syrian political scene.
In this sense, the relevance of “non-aligned” micro-celebrities has to be considered as one of the
causes  and at  the  same times  of  the  products  of  the  shaping  of  a  networked public  sphere
characterized  by  fragmentation  and  media  a-synchronization,  rather  than  coordination  and
media synchronization.
Pendant les révoltes arabes de 2011, les nouveaux médias ont été utilisés comme instruments
efficaces  d’expression  et  de  mobilisation.  En  réduisant  les  coûts  nécessaires  à  l'organisation
d'actions collectives,  les  nouvelles  technologies  ont  introduit  des  formes innovantes  de lutte
politique  basées  sur  un  individualisme  en  réseau  et  sur  ce  que  Bennet  et  Segerber  (2012)
appellent  “connective  action”,  et  non  sur  des  institutions  structurées  ou  des  organisations
hiérarchiques. Pendant les révoltes arabes, une “synchronisation” (Alexander et Aouragh, 2014)
entre médias nouveaux et traditionnels a permis, dans certains cas, l’émergence de récits anti-
hégémoniques capables de créer un large consensus en faveur des mobilisations. Mais les limites
du “web 2.0” en termes de dynamiques de la sphère publique et comme espace au sein duquel
organiser des actions collectives sont également apparues.
Dans cet article, nous nous focaliserons en particulier sur le cas de la sphère publique en réseau
syrienne. Nous maintenons qu’en Syrie la sphère virtuelle apparaît dès le début des protestations
comme un espace contesté au sein duquel les activistes, à la différence de ce qui s'est produit
dans d'autres pays arabes, ne sont pas parvenus à imposer leurs récits.  Au lieu d’une sphère
publique basée sur la connexion, les réseaux en Syrie apparaissent fragmentés et basés sur la
visibilité d’individus spécifiques. 
Pour décrire les dynamiques propres à cette fragmentation, nous nous arrêterons en particulier
sur  ce  qu’on  a  défini  comme  des  micro-célébrités  “non-alignées”  :  la  révolte  syrienne  a  vu
l’émergence de personnes en ligne qui construisent leur identité virtuelle sur la base de récits
individuels,  en opposition avec les principaux récits collectifs circulant sur la scène politique
syrienne après 2011.
En ce sens, l’importance des micro-célébrités “non-alignées” doit être considérée comme l'une
des  causes,  et  en même temps comme l'une des  conséquences,  de  l’émergence d’une sphère
publique en réseaux caractérisée par la fragmentation et une manque de synchronisation entre
les médias, plutôt que sur la coordination et la collaboration.
INDEX
Keywords: Syria, networked public sphere, online micro-celebrities, media synchronisation,
social movements, networked individualism, online identities
Mots-clés: Syrie, sphère publique en réseau, micro-célébrités en ligne, synchronisation des
médias, mouvements sociaux, individualisme en réseau, identités en ligne
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